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CRACKING THE CODE: COMPUTER CODE AS PURE
SPEECH AND ITS FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS ON
THE 3D PRINTED FIREARMS CONTROVERSY
Brian E. Heckmann*
ABSTRACT
The advent of three-dimensional (3D) printing presents unprecedented
challenges to the regulation of digital speech. Whereas previously, ideas
constructed solely of computer code remained reliably in cyberspace, 3D
printing allows for near unlimited physical realization of previously
electronic concepts through relatively rapid prototyping. No controversy
better exemplifies these challenges than that of 3D printed firearms. Those
promoting the availability of 3D printed firearms have waged a years-long
legal battle for the right to participate in the marketplace of ideas, and, at
every turn, have raised First Amendment challenges to the regulations
preventing them from doing so. However, even decades after the near
ubiquitous adoption of the personal computer and internet, the Supreme
Court still has not addressed the status of computer code under the First
status by viewing lower court precedent through the lens of a detailed
understanding of computer science, and by providing originalist support
through a historical analog. Then, this comment applies the accurate First
Amendment status of computer code to address the 3D printed gun
controversy.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 5, 2013, Defense Distributed published on its website computer
almost entirely out of plastic and produced by a 3D printer.1 Within a matter
of days, Defense Distributed received a letter from the United States
Department of State demanding the removal of all CAD files for 3D printable

1 Lee Hutchinson, The First Entirely 3D Printed Handgun Is Here, ARSTECHNICA (May 3, 2013,
7:00 PM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2013/05/the-first-entirely-3d-printed-handgun-is-here/.
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firearms from its website alleging noncompliance with the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR).2
demands, it also eventually filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas alleging, among other things, that prohibiting
publication of the CAD files under AECA and ITAR amounted to an
3

future
prohibition of 3D printed firearms using ITAR is uncertain. The State
Department conceded that AECA and ITAR do not prohibit or prevent purely
domestic electronic exchanges of the CAD files,4 and ITAR allows for
exemptions to be made by the appropriate federal agency on a case-by-case
basis.5 Furthermore, the Trump administration has endorsed specifically
exempting firearm CAD files from the United States Munitions List
(USML),6 a practice likely to change with every presidential transition
between Democrats and Republicans.
In June of 2018, Defense Distributed settled its legal dispute with the
with AECA and ITAR by restricting the dissemination of the CAD files to
consumers within the United States.7 In response, the State Department
agreed to exempt the files from the USML.8 However, several states and the
2 Andy Greenberg, State Department Demands Takedown of 3D-Printable Gun Files for Possible
Export
Control
Violations,
FORBES
(May
9,
2013,
2:36
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/05/09/state-department-demands-takedown-of-3dprintable-gun-for-possible-export-control-violation/#75d73150375f.
3 See generally Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep t of State, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
4 Id. at 695.
5 See 22 C.F.R. § 125.4 (b)(13) (2019).
6 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3 4, Wash. v. U.S. Dep t of
State, No. C18-1115RSL (W.D. Wash. Aug. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Washington Complaint].
7 Admittedly, there are concerns that third parties who legally procure Defense Distributed s CAD
files could then turn around and post them for international download on the dark web or that international
consumers using VPN services could fraudulently represent themselves to Defense Distributed as
domestic consumers. However, neither possibility would render Defense Distributed liable for those
actions so long as Defense Distributed took all reasonable measures to ensure that access to the files was
only available in the United States. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965) (stating that third
party criminal act is a superseding intervening cause unless the third party s criminal act is so foreseeable
as to put the original party on notice).
8 See Christopher Carbone, Texan Says He s Selling 3-D Printed Gun Plans, Despite Ruling, FOX
NEWS (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/tech/texan-says-hes-selling-3-d-printed-gun-plansdespite-ruling; Megan Flynn, Data Allowing People to Print out Their Own Guns Temporarily Blocked
from Internet in Pa. After Legal Pressure, WASH. POST (July 30, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/07/30/data-allowing-people-to-print-outtheir-own-guns-temporarily-blocked-from-internet-in-pa-after-legalpressure/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e070262d2ff8.
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District of Columbia sued to enjoin the State Department from enacting this
settlement in an attempt to further prevent Defense Distributed from
publishing its CAD files.9
publication of
CAD files further complicates an already unprecedented legal issue
combining: (1) The uniqueness and complexity of computer code; (2) the full
legislation with which the States or Federal governments have attempted to
regulate the purely domestic transfer of this type of electronic information;
and (4) the emerging technology of 3D printing, which has the practical effect
of blurring the already often nebulous line between speech and conduct.
Of the forty-eight page complaint filed in the Western District of
Washington, twenty full pages are dedicated, not to any discussion of AECA
or ITAR or the legality of allowing persons outside of the United States to
download the CAD files, but to speculative10 adverse effects the availability
11

Therefore, the apparent intent of the petitioning states is to prevent the
dissemination of the CAD files with or without AECA and ITAR, and if need
be by state specific legislation.
This comment aims to simplify this complex legal issue through a
methodical examination of both computer code and First Amendment
jurisprudence. In order to do this, the comment will be divided into four
principal sections. The first will examine the technical properties of computer
code and 3D printing12; because it is plainly obvious that no legitimate legal
analysis can occur if the nature of what is being analyzed is misunderstood.
The second section will take this understanding of code and compare it to
legal precedent and historical evidence, to support the conclusion that
computer code is pure speech rather than expressive conduct.13 In the third
section, this comment will analyze the current federal mechanism and
9 Kenneth Hall, Federal Judge Temporarily Halts Distribution of 3D Gun Blueprints, JURIST
(Aug. 1, 2018, 11:38 AM), https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/08/federal-judge-temporarily-haltsdistribution-of-3d-gun-blueprints/.
10 As of March 16, 2019, according to Westlaw, there has not been a single case in the entire
United States in either federal or state court involving violations of the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988.
Nor do the petitioning States articulate in their complaint how a 3D printed firearm in substantial
compliance with the Act (and other federal firearms regulations such as the National Firearms Act of
1934) would harm the States interest in maintaining public safety. The complaint relies on a mere
formulaic recitation of existing firearms laws in each state and a conclusory assertion that the publication
of the CAD files will undermine those laws unsupported by any reference to actual incidents where the
laws have been undermined.
11 Washington Complaint, supra note 6, at 21 41.
12
13

See infra Section II.
See infra Section III.
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prospective state mechanisms used to prevent publication of the CAD files to
Amendment.14 Lastly, the final section will discuss possible regulatory
measures that could pass constitutional muster.15
II. BASIC COMPUTER SCIENCE AND 3D PRINTING PRIMER
In order to intelligently examine the First Amendment properties of 3D
printing, it is pertinent to provide a primer on the technological realities of
computer code and 3D printing.
A. Computer Code Fundamentals
At a 50,000-foot perspective, computer code can generally be broken
down into two distinct types of code: (1) the object code; and (2) the source
code.16 The object code is what directs the computer to engage in a certain
activity.17 Specifically, the object code instructs the computer to process
input.18 What appears to the user on the screen is the end result of this process.
Object code operates on the most fundamental level of computer function,
dealing with the basic unit of a binary digit.19 Whenever a movie, a tv show,
audience typically sees a large series of numbers (usually 1s or 0s), the real
life analog to what is being shown is the object code operating at the binary
digit level.20
Object code is the least abstract and most arduous version of computer
code for humans to understand or use.21 However, it is critically important to
note that it is still possible for humans to understand object code.22 Since it is
difficult and time consuming to construct complex operations directly from

14

See infra Section IV.

15

See infra Section V.
HARRY HENDERSON, Compiler, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 95, 95 97 (2009).
17 Id.; HARRY HENDERSON, Bits and Bytes, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 50, 50 51 (2009).
18 HENDERSON, supra note 16, at 95 97; HENDERSON, supra note 17, at 50 51.
19 Id.
20 HENDERSON, supra note 17, at 50 51.
16

21 HARRY HENDERSON, Programming Languages, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 388, 388 89 (2009).
22 Id.
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object code, computer scientists will optimize the creation of new functions
through the use of a programming language.23 This optimized version of code
is known as source code.24 How the source code is actually written depends
on the language it is written in. For example, construction of source code
follows different rules if coding in C, compared to C++, or Java.25 Yet despite
the different rules of construction, these programming languages can be used
to program the same functions. The choice of which programming language
is used is largely determined by the preference of the programmer and his
familiarity with the language.
In essence, different programming languages and their rules of
construction are directly analogous to various spoken languages and their
respec
Amendment generally prohibits prior restraints, except for those which could
subject, direct object, verb, etc.) would undoubtedly vary significantly
between, for example, German and Italian. However, the fundamental
concept expressed by sentence would be the same regardless of the difference
in language. So, too, with programming languages, where the means of how
the programmer tells the computer what he wants to happen will vary but
what idea is conveyed will be the same regardless of the programming
language the function has been coded in.26
In order to bridge the gap between highly abstract source code and the
least abstract object code, computers use a process known as compilation.27
The source code is run through the compiler, the compiler interprets the
directives desired by the source code and outputs those directives in object
code for the machine to act on.28
B. 3D Printing Fundamentals
The 3D printing process follows the same general procedure regardless
of the particular software or hardware that is being used by the printer.29 First,
a 3D model is created using a CAD program.30 A CAD program allows for
23
24

Id.
Id.

25

Id.
See infra Part III(A).
27 HENDERSON, supra note 16, at 95 96.
28 Id.
26

29 See generally RAFIQ NOORANI, 3D PRINTING: TECHNOLOGY, APPLICATIONS, AND SELECTION
31, 31 52 (2017).
30 Id. at 34 36.
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the electronic design of blueprints that previously would have been drawn by
hand.31 Second, that CAD file is converted into a Stereolithography (STL)
file.32 This conversion essentially takes the 3D object in the CAD file and
interprets it as a series of coordinates along the X, Y, and Z axes.33 When
ibe a connected set of triangles to
34
This conversion is usually
file to be exported for use in a different program.35
Third, the STL file is then processed through a slicing program that
takes the object and slices it into hundreds of two-dimensional crosssectioned layers.36 Slicing programs are usually proprietary to each 3D
printer manufacturer, but all manufacturers still use this slicing process.37 The
slicing process is the last opportunity for the user to modify any aspects of
the printed object.38 While the slicing program will not allow the user to
completely change the design of an object to do so would require starting
over again at the CAD stage
thickness, quality of print, extrusion temperature, material, in fill percentage,
39

Fourth, the printer runs and creates the object by layering hot filament
onto the build platform in the shape of a cross-section.40 Then, once it has
finished one layer, the build platform is moved slightly down, and the process
begins again with the next cross-section layer.41 Fifth, and lastly, the object
examined for defects, any extra material is removed, and the object is
cleaned.42 The code of the original CAD-designed object is thus involved
throughout the entire process, albeit in three different iterations.43 The only
part of the process where code may not be involved is the post processing

31 HARRY HENDERSON, Computer-Aided Design and Manufacturing, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 98, 98 99 (2009).
32

NOORANI, supra note 29, at 36 39.
Id. at 36 37.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 37.
33

36

Id. at 39 40.
Id.
38 Id.
37

39

Id.
Id. at 40.
41 Id.
40

42
43

Id. at 40 42.
See generally id. at 31 52.
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stage, but only if the postprocessing is done by hand or without the aid of
computers.
III. COMPUTER CODE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A MEDIUM OF
PURE SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of the United States has never
(apart from its status under copyright and trademark law). There are three
possible interpretations on the issue: first, that computer code constitutes pure
speech comparable to traditional language; second, that computer code is
expressive conduct with non-speech elements; and third, that computer code
is conduct with no communicative qualities as speech and thus exists outside
of the protections of the First Amendment.44 Without a clear statement of
interpretation from the Court, various lower courts have endorsed differing
interpretations.45 However, as will be discussed, the conclusion that computer
code is pure speech comparable to traditional languages more accurately
reflects the realities of how computer code operates. Furthermore, this
interpretation receives such considerable originalist support that it should
prevail over all other interpretations.46
A. Existing Case Law Supports This Conclusion
Two of the most comprehensive cases to discuss the First Amendment
status of computer code are Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley and
Bernstein v. United States Department of State.47 In Corley, Mr. Corley
developed decryption software that could be used to remove the anti-piracy
encryption protecting copywritten movies distributed on DVDs.48 While the
court ruled that computer code is protected as pure speech under the First
Amendment,49 it then created a false distinction between computer code and

44

John P. Collins, Jr., Note, Speaking in Code, 106 YALE L.J. 2691, 2691 92 (1997).
Compare Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 451 (2d Cir. 2001), with Bernstein v.
U.S. Dep t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 37 (N.D. Cal. 1996); see also Mark C. Bennett, Was I
Speaking to You?: Purely Functional Source Code As Noncovered Speech, 92 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1494, 1504
06 (2017).
46 See infra Part III(B).
45

47

See generally Corley, 273 F.3d 429; Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. 1426.
See Corley, 273 F.3d at 436 40.
49
If someone chose to write a novel entirely in computer object code by using strings of 1 s and
0 s for each letter of each word, the resulting work would be no different for constitutional purposes than
if it had been written in English. Id. at 445 46.
48
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certain computer programs.50 The court insinuated that the execution of
would not be protected under the First Amendment.51
This distinction is logically suspect. It would allow the government to
censor otherwise protected speech, so long as it could be proven that the
audience to whom the speech was directed did not understand the speech or
ignored it.52 A rule like this would result in chaos, as any First Amendment
decision regarding computer code or technology would be predicated upon
the relative technological acumen of each individual plaintiff. Something as
important as the fundamental right of a speaker to publish his wares in the
marketplace of ideas53 depends no more on the ability of his audience to fully
appreciate the nuances of every concept discussed than it would depend on
54

The Bernstein court endorsed a much more accurate (and unlike Corley,
First Amendment. Dr.
Bernstein, then a Ph.D. candidate at UC Berkley studying applied
mathematics, created an encryption and decryption program using the
programming language C.55
56
and the decryption program w
Dr. Bernstein
wanted to publish his dissertation as well as Snuffle.c and Unsnuffle.c, to be

50

See id. at 445 52.

51

See id. at 448 49.
By hinging its First Amendment analysis on the audience s reaction (or lack of reaction) to the
speaker, the Corley court ignored significant Supreme Court jurisprudence to the contrary. Cf. Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (noting that the emotive impact of speech on an audience is not a
secondary effect and therefore largely irrelevant to the First Amendment analysis); NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 29 (1982) (reaffirming an exacting standard to censor speech based on
the audience s possible incitement to violent and lawless action rather than a lower standard based on
mere speculation of potential wrongful conduct by the audience). Additionally, future cases would
reaffirm the insignificance of audience reaction. Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 61 (2011)
(stating that the emotional or physical pain effected upon the audience as a result of the speaker s offensive
speech insufficient to abridge the First Amendment rights of the speaker).
53 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 76 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
54 Consider, for example, a video on Youtube.com of a law professor discussing Justice Jackson s
famously profound opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
The audio and video displayed could be identical to what a student in class would see and hear. But unless
the YouTube viewer could explain to a court how exactly the audio and video were replicated through his
computer or articulate some intercession of the mind or will that occurred after initially clicking to play
the video, then, under the Corley court s logic, the government would be justified in preventing that
viewer s access to the speech even if they would not be justified in preventing access to an experienced
software engineer or a law student present when the video was made.
52

55
56

Bernstein v. U.S. Dep t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 29 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
Id. at 1429.
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able to teach students the algorithm he used to create the programs and to
present the code at academic conferences.57
However, the AECA allows the President (and the Secretary of State,
using the authority delegated to him through ITAR) to add certain items to
the USML and prohibit their export or import without a license.58 Under
section 121.1, Category XIII of the USML items known as,
exclusions.59 Dr. Bernstein (much like Defense Distributed twenty-one years
later) found himself at odds with the State Department, which insisted that
both Snuffle.c and Unsnuffle.c required a license under the AECA prior to
publication. Dr. Bernstein filed suit against the State Department alleging,
among other things, that AECA and ITAR were unconstitutional as content
based prior restraints on his speech both facially and as applied.
Dr. Bernstein advocated that his code should be protected as pure
speech, while the federal government argued that computer code did not
constitute speech but was instead pure conduct that lacked sufficient elements
of communication to be protected by the First Amendment under the SpenceHurley test.60
misguided, dubious, and lacking any support in First Amendment
jurisprudence.61 The court reasoned that Spence-Hurley
nto the
communicative nature of conduct only after concluding that the act at issue
62

While the court
it was so dissimilar to the
non-verbal expressive conduct in the Spence progeny of cases that it would
63

57
58

Id. at 1430.
See id. at 1429; see also 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2014); 22 C.F.R. §§ 120 30 (2014).

59

See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1429; see also 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2018).
See id. at 1434; see also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
61 Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1434 36.
60

62

Id. at 1434 (emphasis added).
Whether source code and object code are functional is immaterial to the analysis at this stage.
Contrary to defendants suggestion, the functionality of a language does not make it any less like
speech . . . Thus, even if [computer code] . . . is essentially functional, that does not remove it from
the realm of speech. Instructions, do-it-yourself manuals, recipes, even technical information . . . are
often purely functional; they are also speech. Music, for example, is speech protected under the First
Amendment. The music inscribed in code on the roll of a player piano is no less protected for being
wholly functional. Like source code converted to object code, it communicates to and directs the
instrument itself, rather than the musician, to produce the music. That does not mean it is not speech.
Like music and mathematical equations, computer language is just that, language, and it
communicates information either to a computer or to those who can read it.
Id. at 1435.
63
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determine how expressive it is when, at least formally, it appears to be
64

It was clear to the Bernstein court, and should be clear to any
practitioner of the law, that computer code is the written word.65 It may be
written using a keyboard rather than a pen, or in C++ instead of English, but
the Bernstein court correctly found these differences to be irrelevant.66 To
support its conclusions, the Bernstein court cited the Ninth Circuit in holding:
Of course, speech in any language consists of the
putting pen to paper, or hand to keyboard. Yet the fact that
that is, a
sophisticated and complex system of understood
meanings is what makes it speech. Language is by
definition speech, and the regulation of any language is the
regulation of speech.67
The court further held that no particular language changes the nature of
languages as a general concept under the First Amendment.68 For the
purposes of the First Amendment, the court ruled that there is no meaningful
difference between the abstract programming languages of source code
(C++, Java, etc.), the relatively non-abstract object code, and traditional
spoken languages such as English and Italian.69
70

Furthermore, once it had ruled that computer code and the languages that it
operates in are definitively speech, the Bernstein court held that the
functionality of such speech is immaterial.71 Even if the communication of
ideas in a language was essentially functional, it does not change the quality
of what is said in the language to something other than speech.72
It is easy to see why Bernstein provides a more desirable holding for the

64
65

Id.
Id. at 1434 35.

66

See id. at 1435.
Id. (quoting Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 1995),
vacated as moot sub nom. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997)) (emphasis
added).
67

68

Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1435.
Id.
70 Id.
69

71
72

Id. at 1435 37.
Id.
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under the First Amendment. Corley
computer science provides good reason to be hesitant to endorse the
opinion.73 Even more damning to the Corley
their opinion results in an illogical and unworkable analysis. Corley implies
that it would consider code as analogous to traditional languages just as
Bernstein would.74 Yet, it contradicts itself and would apply a different
analytical framework to the same speech from different perspectives.75 If
traditional languages were protected under the First Amendment in the
manner adopted by Corley, it would result in absurd and chaotically different
rulings antithetical to the purpose of the Amendment.76 By comparison,
Bernstein is completely logical in its reasoning and provides consistent
results regardless of the technological acumen of the audience.
B. Cryptography as a Historical Analog Used by the Founders
Provides Originalist Support for the Conclusion that Computer
Code Is Pure Speech
While the Bernstein
considering computer code as pure speech, there is still a certain difficulty in
reconciling a twenty-first century practice with the eighteenth-century
concept of freedom of speech as understood by the founders and codified in
the First Amendment. The Court has, in the past, addressed the First
Amendment status of technology foreign to the founding generation based
on its utility as a means for the conveyance of ideas.77 Yet, in the case of
computer code, there is a very strong and persuasively analogous medium
well-known to and used by the founders. One which they undoubtedly
considered protected under the First Amendment: cryptography.
Cryptography in the age before computers involved encoding written
documents using cyphers to prevent the documents from being understood

73
74
75

See supra notes 47 54.
See Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 46 (2d Cir. 2001).

Id. at 447 48.
See supra note 54.
77 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). Furthermore, in the context of the
religion clauses, the Court has predicated much of their analysis on a historical understanding of the
founders intent; specifically, the understanding of the First Amendment of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison. See also McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885 912 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 722 35 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
609 31 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 16 (1947).
76
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by anybody other than the intended recipient.78 The ciphertext (encoded
message) would be processed using a predetermined key (sometimes a word,
sometimes a number to shift letters) and thus decoded into plaintext that any
literate person could understand.79 The parallels between the process of
classical encryption and that of computer processing are obvious. The source
code (much like the ciphertext) acts as an abstract text, easily understood by
those writing it but not by the computer awaiting instruction. The compiler
serves the same function as the key, allowing for the translation of the cipher
text and the ability to act on its information. Last, the object code resembles
plaintext, the least abstract, most direct format of the information conveyed.
Cryptography has existed nearly as long as the written word.80 As long
as there has been powerful nations engaging in espionage, diplomacy, or
military campaigns, there have been heads of state seeking to encrypt their
81
Famously, Julius Caesar created his own skip cypher
for use in his personal correspondence.82 Anybody who received a classical
education such as the founding fathers would be familiar with the history
of the Caesarian cypher.
In particular, George Washington was undoubtedly familiar with the
spymaster.83 Under his direction, Major Benjamin Tallmadge organized the
famous Culper spy ring in New York.84 The ring would use a code book to
encrypt letters sent out of Manhattan by replacing individual words with
prearranged numbers (not conceptually dissimilar to the binary digits that
make up object code).85 While Washington used the Culper code book, he
also created his own ciphers to use in personal correspondence and military
dispatches.86

78 JOHN F. MURPHY, JR., Cryptography, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Vol. I, 182 83 (Rodney P. Carlisle ed., 2005).
79 Id.
80 See generally JOHN F. MURPHY, JR., Timeline of Intelligence, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Vol. I, xv xvi (Rodney P. Carlisle ed., 2005).
81 See generally id.
82 SUETONIUS, The Life of Julius Caesar, in THE LIVES OF THE CAESARS, 54 (Catharine Edwards,
trans., Oxford Univ. Press) (2000).
83 See generally Edward G. Lengel, George Washington: Spymaster in Chief, MILITARY HISTORY
(July 2009), https://www.historynet.com/george-washington-spymaster-chief.htm.
84 See id.; The Culper Code Book, MOUNT VERNON, https://www.mountvernon.org/georgewashington/the-revolutionary-war/spying-and-espionage/the-culper-code-book/.
85
86

The Culper Code Book, supra note 84; see also supra Section II(A).
See Lengel, supra note 83.
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Although modern legal orthodoxy holds that freedom of speech is not
absolute87 therefore, strongly implying the founding fathers did not intend
it as absolute either the protection of encoded messages and ciphers can
easily be presumed from the content of the message and context in which the
founders used them. This presumption survives even in the absence of an
express statement of such protection. The best evidence for this is the letters
between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.88
Jefferson first sent Madison a cypher to use for their communications in
May 1785, while the former was serving as the second United States
Ambassador to France.89 Jefferson and Madison did not usually encode the
entirety of their correspondence, only those parts which they deemed
pertinent to keep secret in case of interception.90 While some small parts of
the letters were purely personal, most of the content was dedicated to matters
of such social or political importance to the United States as to warrant First
Amendment protection.91 For example, the writer would begin to talk about
92
Then
the letter would shift to encoded text, without breaking the grammar or syntax
of the sentence, when the writer sought to provide his own personal insight

87
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. Chaplinsky v. State
of N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 571 72 (1942). A comprehensive list of the speech the Court holds categorically
unprotected by the First Amendment is given by Justice Kennedy in the Court s opinion of United States
v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716 18 (2012). See also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)
( Content-based laws those that target speech based on its communicative content are presumptively
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to
serve compelling state interests. ).
88 See generally Letters Between James Madison and Thomas Jefferson (1780 1826) (on file with
the
National
Archives)
available
at
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Correspondent%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22%20Correspon
dent%3A%22Madison%2C%20James%22&s=1111211111&r=251.
89 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 11, 1785) (on file with the National
Archives) available at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0150.
90 E.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 23, 1788) (on file with the National
Archives)
available
at
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Correspondent%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22%20Correspon
dent%3A%22Madison%2C%20James%22&s=1111311111&r=253.
91 Id.; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 755 (1982) (discussing at length that part of the
rationale behind categorical exclusion of certain speech was because that speech had little to no, literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value ).
92 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 20, 1785) (on file with the National
Archives)
available
at
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Correspondent%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22%20Correspon
dent%3A%22Madison%2C%20James%22&s=1111311111&r=155.
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in disrupting trade was an attempt to fracture the young union of states.93
The content of the encoded text varied from international intrigue
94
to domestic partisan
95
schemes within Congress and the several states, to even personal matters
and revelations such as Madison confiding in Jefferson that he, John Jay, and
Alexander Hamilton wrote the Federalist Papers under the pseudonym of
Publius.96 Yet, for how varied the subject matter was, one characteristic was
constant: the encoded text was always of a nature that has been
unquestionably held protected under the First Amendment.97
-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
98
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
The
99
100
101
words encoded were not lewd or obscene, libelous, or profane. The
words were not used to commission a crime.102 Instead, they were the
medium through which two of the most significant legal minds in early
American history participated in the diffusion of ideas, which is the very
purpose103
Perhaps the biggest motivation in adopting the free expression clause of
the First Amendment was to preserve the free and open expression of ideas
from the arbitrary censorship of a sovereign ideologically opposed to what
93

Id.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 23, 1788) (on file with the National
Archives)
available
at
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Correspondent%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22%20Correspon
dent%3A%22Madison%2C%20James%22&s=1111311111&r=254.
94

95 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788) (on file with the National
Archives)
available
at
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Correspondent%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22%20Correspon
dent%3A%22Madison%2C%20James%22&s=1111311111&r=259.
96 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 10, 1788) (on file with the National
Archives) available at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0159.
97 Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 72 (1942) (Where none of the categories
the Court counted as categorically excluded would apply to the letters in question.).
98 See id.
99

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
101 See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
102
But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course
of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502
(1949).
103 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
100
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was being said.104
correspondence as being protected from governmental censorship of the
ideas expressed, but to also consider the same ideas further expressed in
encoded text as unprotected is a completely arbitrary, illogical, and
unworkable conclusion. The only logical conclusion is that the properties of
speech under the First Amendment are unaffected by the medium of
conveyance, to include encryption. Furthermore, it must be understood that
the cipher itself is protected as a crucial component allowing speakers to
utilize their reasonably chosen medium of communication.
Last, it is worth noting that the Founders would likely consider their
private correspondence protected from government interference under the
Fourth Amendment.105 However, without taking an unnecessary detour
through another expansive and complex area of constitutional jurisprudence,
it should suffice to say that the forum of the speech conveyed (personal
letters) is irrelevant.106 What matters is the substance of the ideas conveyed107
and the mechanism used to convey them (cryptography).
C. The DefCAD Files Are Not Only Pure Speech but also Pure
Speech Protected Under the First Amendment
As has been explored, the assertion that computer code is pure speech is
supported by sound precedent108 as well as history.109 Yet, just because
something is pure speech (or expressive conduct) does not mean that it will
automatically receive First Amendment protection.110 There must be an
inquiry into the message and context of the speech. For example, a picture
can receive significant First Amendment protection when it depicts a

104 See Police Dep t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 76
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
105 The Founders would likely have considered private letters to fall under the papers or
effects language of the Fourth Amendment.
106 Compare Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 16 (1939), with New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 755 (1982) (both speech in private and in the public fora that involves issues of
public importance are protected).
107 See generally Ferber, 458 U.S. at 755 (discussing at length that part of the rationale behind
categorical exclusion of certain speech was because that speech had little to no literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value ).
108 See supra Section III(A).
109

See supra Section III(B).
See generally Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
110
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running naked after her clothes have been burned off by napalm).111 But
nobody would seriously claim that any protection should be given to similar
pictures in other contexts (e.g., child pornography).112 This begs the question:
what are the CAD files in dispute actually saying?
speech with little to no constitutional protection is foolish and misguided.
greater access to and ability to exercise the individual constitutional right to
bear arms.113 The end result, the printed guns, are commodities. The CAD
files are information that conveys the idea of that commodity yet to be
realized. Does that idea hold any literary, artistic, political, educational, or
scientific value?114 The objective, non-partisan answer is yes: these ideas
have significant educational and scientific value as means for debating and
experimenting with the engineering process of firearms.
CAD files are not used exclusively in additive manufacturing.115 They
are also the basis for traditional subtractive manufacturing.116 Conventional
gun manufacturers will still design their firearms using CAD software, and
then those electronic blueprints will be used with a lathe, which creates the
firearm out of a steel block. The nature of CAD files allows the designer or
the engineer the ability to effortlessly experiment and attempt to optimize
their product.117 This is the purpose and message behind Defense
change the files to try their own hands at engineering a firearm. As noted
previously, up until the CAD file is sliced, there is still the opportunity to
significantly alter it.118 These files facilitate the diffusion of ideas among the
marketplace of ideas,119 albeit within the limited subsects of mechanical
engineering, firearms manufacturing, and testing the tensile strength of
different parts of the design.

111

Nick Ut, THE TERROR OF WAR (1972), http://100photos.time.com/photos/nick-ut-terror-war.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773.
113
[A]dvertising which links a product to a current public debate is not thereby entitled to the
constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 68 (1983).
114 Cf. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 755; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (noting where the
Court used these touchstones in their analysis determining whether speech should be protected).
115 NOORANI, supra note 29, at 31 34.
116 Id.
117 HENDERSON, supra note 31, at 98 99.
112

118

See supra Section II(B).
See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
119
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Furthermore, 3D printing assists the amateur gunsmiths who lack the
financial resources to experiment using conventional lathes (which cost
thousands of dollars)120 and to procure the expensive raw materials used in
the lathes. These CAD files and the 3D printing process provide a
significantly lower barrier to entry. Amateur gunsmiths are also more likely
to take risks in design than established manufacturers. Since the cost of
production is relatively low, a mechanical engineer with a 3D printer could
develop and test an innovative new firearm without having to worry about
ruinous sunk costs. If his prototype fails catastrophically when tested, then
he simply goes back to the drawing board. If his prototype works, he can
patent it and begin to seek partners for large scale conventional
manufacturing. By prohibiting the opportunity for limited capital inventors
to use 3D printing and CAD files for experimentation, the State stunts the
development of a lawful commodity. Furthermore, by restricting access to
such resources the government creates a risk of censoring the speech of the
disadvantaged amateur engineers who lack financial resources; which, in
turn, creates concerns of favoritism and protectionism towards established
manufacturers.121
IV. EXISTING FEDERAL REGULATION IS FACIALLY NEUTRAL BUT
CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID DUE TO THE EXERCISE OF
BOUNDLESS DISCRETION BY THE GOVERNMENT.
PROSPECTIVE STATE REGULATION IS LIKELY TO BE
FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Distributed, a primer on the law of prior restraints is well advised. A prior
restraint is any form of regulation imposed by the government that
prerequires government approval before somebody can speak.122 It is also,

120 The CBT1640 CNC Metal Lathe, BOLTON TOOLS, https://boltontool.com/16-x-40-cnc-metallathe-machine-with-six-poisition-toolpostcbt1640?search=CBT1640&gclid=CjwKCAjw4LfkBRBDEiwAc2DSlE4bIgbszPRMvj1MGPXi_Oyqkv0JJ08Kt05ueAEzlg3VBFfXwULyxoC108QAvD_BwE (last visited Mar.
17, 2019).
121 Cf. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1676 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining
that by banning judicial candidates from individually soliciting campaign donations, the Florida law
violated the First Amendment by favoring the political speech of some candidates the incumbent judges
and wealthier candidates over that of the challenger or less wealthy candidates).
122
In its simple, most blatant form, a prior restraint is a law which requires submission of speech
to an official who may grant or deny permission to utter or publish it based upon its contents. Alexander
v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 566 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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rights . . . [it] has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that
123

124

vali

However, they are not patently unconstitutional. A content

of the regulated speech . . . narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and . . . leave[s] open ample alternative channels for
125
A content based prior restraint must
satisfy strict scrutiny, meaning that the government must demonstrate the
prior restraint serves the more demanding compelling interest standard.126
Yet, even ostensibly content neutral restrictions on speech can be of
such a quality that they are for all intents and purposes content based, and as
such, the government must have a compelling reason to enact them.127
Furthermore, while traditionally the Court has rejected the practice of
determining and evaluating legislative motives,128 more recent cases have
signaled that an improper legislative intent is a relevant part of the content
based analysis.129 This shift in focus suggests that the current Court would be
willing to strike down a facially neutral law under the strict scrutiny standard
if they are able to elicit improper censorial motives in the enactment or
enforcement of the law.
Even if a prior restraint pas
neutral analysis, it will still be held as constitutionally invalid if it conditions

123
124
125

Nebraska Press Ass n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).

Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015).
127
Our precedents have also recognized a separate and additional category of laws that, though
facially content neutral, will be considered content-based regulations of speech: laws that cannot be
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, or that were adopted by the government
because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys, . . . Those laws, like those that are
content based on their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny. Id. at 2227.
128
As we have said before, however, this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit motive. City of Erie v. Pap s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 292 (2000).
129
A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the
government s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of animus toward the ideas contained
in the regulated speech. . . . Because strict scrutiny applies either when a law is content based on its face
or when the purpose and justification for the law are content based, a court must evaluate each question
before it concludes that the law is content neutral and thus subject to a lower level of scrutiny. . . . The
First Amendment requires no less. Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented
by a facially content-based statute, as future government officials may one day wield such statutes to
suppress disfavored speech. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 29 (emphasis added).
126
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The common sense, and perhaps well

it would allow an otherwise facially content neutral prior restraint to be
wielded in a discriminatory manner so as to censor speakers who advocate
views the government official is ideologically or politically opposed to.131
The speaker would be left with no recourse to challenge the censorship
besides a lengthy and expensive legal battle,132 which they may well not be
able to afford in either money or time.
There is a significant difference between the analyses for prior restraints
on pure speech and prior restraints on expressive conduct. Prior restraints of
pure speech are analyzed under the Clark, Lakewood, and Saia precedents as
previously mentioned.133 By comparison, restraints on expressive conduct are
analyzed under a less rigorous standard. A prior restraint on expressive
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
134

The Defense Distributed court erroneously applied the lesser
135
. . . as subject to the protection
This language
implies the court considered the CAD files as expressive conduct but not pure
speech.136 The prior sections of this comment have already discussed why
that consideration was erroneous.137 Second, the court determined that the
AECA, ITAR, and USML were content neutral prior restraints.138 That
analysis was mistaken as it failed to consider how the Directorate of Defense
Trade Controls (DDTC) abused its discretion by ignoring the statutorily
prescribed safeguards to channel its decision-making authority; effectively

130

City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 (1988).
Cf. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 29. See generally Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560 61 (1948).
132 See generally Saia, 334 U.S. at 560 61.
131

133 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2218; Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 750; Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 297 98 (1984); Saia, 334 U.S. at 558.
134 United States v. O Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
135 Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep t of State, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680, 692 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (emphasis
added).
136 Nota bene the fact that the court describes the files as subject to the protection of the First
Amendment and not as speech is significant. Such a distinction has been used to distinguish the
constitutional status of expressive conduct from pure speech. See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 405 06 (1989).
137
138

See supra Part II and Part III.
Def. Distributed, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 694.
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making the AECA, ITAR, and USML content based prior restraints as
applied.139
A. Federal Regulation Under AECA, ITAR, and USML Were Content
Based As Applied Because the DDTC Failed to Follow the
Mechanisms Prescribed to Channel Its Discretion
It is obvious that the Western District of Texas erred in ruling that
AECA, ITAR, and the USML acted in concert as content neutral prior
restraints against Defense Distributed. This conclusion is based on two
factual occurrences that went unanalyzed by the court and unexplained by
on the CAD
files140 outside of the proper commodity jurisdiction proceedings; and (2) the
CAD files when such an inclusion clearly is not within the plain reading of
the law. Both of these actions by the DDTC exhibit a disconcerting disregard
for the statutorily prescribed rules141
when evaluating whether or not an item is subject to ITAR under commodity
jurisdiction.
These actions raise the same concern over ideological or political abuse
of boundless discretion the Court articulated in Saia and Reed.142 This
concern is further compounded by reasonable inferences: (1) from the prior
political actions of Kenneth B. Handelman,143 the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Defense Trade Controls who managed the DDTC at the time of
the determination; (2) from the failure to provide a timely determination on
the commodity jurisdiction requests as required by law;144 and (3) from the

139
140

See infra Part IV(A).

Complaint at 5, Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep t of State, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680 (W.D. Tex. 2015)
(No. 1:15-cv-372) [hereinafter Def. Distributed Complaint].
141 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (2014).
142 See generally Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2218 (2015); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558,
560 61 (1948).
143 Prior to his work at the State Department, Handelman was the Legislative Director for Senator
Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH), the initial sponsor of the Brady Handgun Bill. Kenneth B. Handelman:
Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. DEP T OF
DEF.,
https://dod.defense.gov/About/Biographies/Biography-View/Article/618086/kenneth-bhandelman/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); President Signs Brady Gun Control Law, CQ ALMANAC 1993,
300 03 (49th ed.), https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal93-1105725 (last visited
Nov. 3, 2019); see also Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 29.
144 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(d)(2) (2014).
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neral advocacy for greater gun control145 which
146

1. The DDTC Abused Its Discretion by Failing to Justify Its
Irregular Conduct
When the State Department originally contacted Defense Distributed
regarding supposed noncompliance with ITAR, Defense Distributed
submitted a commodity jurisdiction request to the DDTC for a miniature
erate it.147 Defense
Distributed also submitted nine further commodity jurisdiction requests for
prepublication approval of firearm CAD files.148 Whenever the State
USML, it provides the producer of the item the opportunity to request a
commodity jurisdiction determination by submitting a specific form.149 Each
specifications, and any
other documentation related to the article or service should be submitted as
150

These requests are specific to each individual item.151 For example,
when Defense Distributed was first contacted by the State Department and,
in response, submitted ten different commodity jurisdiction requests to
include the Ghost Gunner lathe and nine CAD files,152 the commodity
jurisdiction process required the DDTC to make an individualized
determination of each request.153 However, two years after Defense

145 See US Gun Debate: Obama Unveils Gun Control Proposals, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-21049942; Party Platform: Preventing Gun Violence,
DEMOCRATIC NAT L COMMITTEE, https://democrats.org/where-we-stand/the-issues/preventing-gunviolence/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
146 Def. Distributed Complaint, supra note 140, at 4; About, DEF. DISTRIBUTED,
https://defdist.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
147 Def. Distributed Complaint, supra note 140, at 4 5.
148 Id. at 5.
149 See generally 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (2014).
150 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(c) (2019). Nota bene the language of the statute is exclusively singular. The
lack of plural verbiage indicates the statute requires individualized determinations, not ad hoc group
determinations.
151 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(c) (2019).
152
153

Def. Distributed Complaint, supra note 140, at 7.
22 C.F.R. § 120.4(d)(2) (2019).
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Distributed filed commodity jurisdiction requests, the DDTC failed to
provide determinations on any of the ten requests.154
Defense Distributed submitted a second (and eleventh overall) request
specifically regarding the Ghost Gunner lathe.155 Four months after this
second request for the Ghost Gunner, the DDTC provided a determination.156
But the outstanding nine requests never received a determination.157 While
the DDTC determined the Ghost Gunner and software required to operate it
were not subject to control under ITAR,158 the DDTC also added on to their
determination regarding the Ghost Gunner (seemingly as an ad hoc
afterthought) a statement notifying Defense Distributed that its other
ng, and models for producing a
defense article, to include 80% AR-15 lower receivers, are subject to the
159
The
State Department did this despite the fact that the specific Defense
Distributed requested review of those items was never answered by the
DDTC.160 This directly contradicts the requirement for an individualized
determination set by Congress and constitutes an ultra vires abuse of the
discretion provided to the DDTC under commodity jurisdiction
proceedings.161 It also prevents Defense Distributed from understanding what
characteristics or aspects of its CAD files cause the files to be subject to
ITAR, thereby preventing Defense Distributed any meaningful opportunity
These actions objectively raise the specter of politically motivated
viewpoint censorship that the Court has categorically refused to
countenance.162
jurisdiction requests to wallow unanswered for over two years. Yet, the
DDTC proved that it was capable of taking timely action by responding to
y jurisdiction request for the Ghost
Gunner lathe in four months. The lathe is, by any objective measure, far more
capable of manufacturing effective and durable firearms than the
experimental and fragile firearms derived from 3D printing.

154

Def. Distributed Complaint, supra note 140, at 8.
Id. at 5.
156 Id.
155

157

Id.
Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
158

161

See 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (2019).
See Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 29 (2015); see also Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558, 560 61 (1948); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939).
162
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Why was the DDT
software used to operate it presumably with the knowledge that CAD files
are used as part of its operation but then refuse to allow publication of CAD
files that had the stated purpose of being used in a 3D printer? This decision
is nonsensical given the fact that the same CAD files could be used to operate
the Ghost Gunner, even though there has been no indication that there is a
demand for 3D printed firearms among the foreign enemies of the United
preventing trafficking in arms,163 and the conclusion seems inescapable that
the DDTC used ITAR as a mere pretext to censor political speech it did not
like.164 If the decision was not politically motivated, it would follow logically
that the Ghost Gunner lathe should have been restricted as subject to ITAR
while the CAD files should have been approved.165
2. The DDTC Abused Its Discretion by Imputing a Definition to
That Is Both Unreasonable and
Significantly Different Than the Definition Intended by
Congress
The second indication that the DDTC abused its discretion and engaged
in viewpoint discrimination against Defense Distributed is the expansion of
the statutory d
reading.166 Consistently throughout litigation, the State Department asserted
that the CAD files in dispute are not defense articles in the traditional sense
167
of munitions, but rather in the sense
While the court

163 As previously mentioned, the 3D printing process is effectively limited to use in prototyping
new firearms. 3D printing is cheaper, but often more time consuming and results in a more fragile product.
The printed guns are more novelty than weapon of war. In contrast, a metal lathe can produce conventional
small arms that are much more durable and practical to use on a battlefield. It therefore seems that the
DDTC s decision to allow the export of the means to create conventional arms, while denying export of
the means to create novelties, is counterproductive to the stated goal of preventing arms trafficking
benefiting enemies of the United States.
164 This conclusion is compounded by DDTC s failure to provide reasoning for decision, meaning
that there can be no judicial review of their discretionary motives. This ambiguous government motive for
censorship is far removed from the openly recognized benign motives contemplated and expressly
rejected by Reed. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 29.
165 See supra note 163.
166 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (2019).
167 See generally Defendants Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Def.
Distributed v. U.S. Dep t. of State, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-372-RP); Brief
of Respondent-Appellees, Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep t. of State, 838 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 2016).

2020]

Cracking the Code

389

defined168 to include information such as any non-software blueprints169 and
software directly related to defense articles,170 the court clearly erred in
171

The plain reading of the

distinct groups: analog172 and software.173 The CAD files in dispute appear
not to fit into either category, being a digital form of media but not software.
Software is computer code that allows for the execution of files and the
resulting action to be completed by the computer.174 The CAD files are what
is being executed, not the software doing the execution.175
to bar Defense Distributed from publishing the CAD files rather than
properly adding CAD files to the USML under Category XXI176 until such a
time as the technical data definition could be amended or otherwise clarified
by Congress. Through this action, the DDTC abused its discretion and acted
beyond the scope of its authority by reading, into a term defined by Congress,
a secondary definition that Congress failed to write itself.177 The DDTC, a
politically appointed position within the executive branch, in effect usurped
the congressional prerogative to create and amend law. It further
compounded this abuse of discretion by completely ignoring the statutorily
provided mechanism for temporarily including a previously unconsidered
item under the USML until Congress the proper authority could review
the item and determine if it should be added to the USML.
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22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (2019).
22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(1) (2019).
170 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(4) (2019).
171 Def. Distributed, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 694.
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See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(1) (3) (2019).
See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(4) (2019).
See DANIEL B. GARRIE & FRANCIS M. ALLEGRA, PLUGGED IN: GUIDEBOOK TO SOFTWARE
2.1, at 45 46 (2013).
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See supra Section II(B).
See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category XXI (2019).
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Context establishes the conditions for applying the [Negative-Implication Cannon], but where
those conditions exist, the principle that specification of the one implies exclusion of the other validly
describes how people express themselves and understand verbal expression. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107 (2012). See also id. at 107 11.
In Defense Distributed s case, the critical contexts are: (1) The express distinction between analog
technical data (such as blueprints) and software made in 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(1); (2) The absence of
executable files but enumeration of application programs in 22 C.F.R. § 120.45(f) statutory definition of
software ; and (3) The language of 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category XXI acting as a temporary catch all
provision for articles not considered by Congress until such a time that Congress would decide to amend
the USML.
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It is hard to think of any possible legitimate motive for the DDTC to so
blatantly abandon the explicitly defined due process. There simply is no
objective justification for the DDTC to act in the way they did. At best, it
may have been unbiased incompetence, but the worst-case scenario is
patently unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. These acts strongly
implicate the concern of political censorship178 specifically aimed179 at
Def
the Democrats held the executive branch while the Republicans controlled
both houses of Congress. If the DDTC had added the CAD files to Category
XXI, it is unlikely that a gun-rights-friendly Congress would agree to include
them in the USML (especially given the publicity of the 3D printed gun
controversy and the upcoming 2016 election). This, obviously, was contrary
to the political interests of the Obama administration and would prove
problematic as Category XXI only allows for temporary restriction. But by
disregarding procedure and congressional authority, the DDTC ensured the
CAD files would not be disseminated either abroad or in the United States
until there was either a successful legal challenge or a change in
administration.
B. Prospective State Regulation in the Form of a Complete Ban Is
Unconstitutional
At the time of the writing of this comment, no state, as of yet, has written
any law regulating 3D printed firearms; and as such, this section is
necessarily speculative and brief. For the time being, any state that does not
because the injunction from the Western District of Washington makes other
regulatory action unnecessarily redundant. However, should that injunction
be invalidated, or the case resolved in some other manner, the states who did
seek the injunction will almost certainly act to regulate 3D printed firearms
in the absence of federal regulation.
While no proposals have been put forward, the tone of the complaint
and political stances of the state administrations suggest that the intended
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See generally Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560 61 (1948).
This inference is strengthened by the fact that the DDTC did not purport to restrict all firearm
CAD files, only those published by Defense Distributed. As previously mentioned, conventional
subtractive manufacturing of firearms also uses CAD files of the components. Many manufacturers such
as Glock still manufacture their products overseas. Yet, there is no indication that the DDTC prohibited
the engineers working for Glock in the United States from sending their CAD designs to the factory in
Austria for production. See generally Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1676 (2015) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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course of action would be a total prohibition on the files.180 The states seem
to be adverse to the idea of any level of public availability of the CAD files,
and so it is unlikely they would implement a more limited time, place, or
manner restriction.181 Therefore, the states would have to justify their
regulation on the grounds that the CAD files are either categorically excluded
from the protection of the First Amendment, or they would have to satisfy
the strict scrutiny standard. Without any binding precedent specifically
regarding 3D printed firearm CAD files, the lower courts would have to apply
general principles of First Amendment law. Any prospective state laws
resulting in a complete prohibition of the CAD files should be held invalid
for the following well established doctrinal reasons.
1. 3D Printed CAD Files Are Ineligible for Categorical
Exclusion From First Amendment Protection Because the
States Cannot Show An Unrecognized Historical Practice of
Censorship
As mentioned previously, computer code is best understood as pure
speech,182 though not all pure speech falls within the protection of the First
Amendment.183 However, the Court is incredibly hesitant to recognize new
classes of categorically unprotected speech.184 A new class will be recognized
only when the Court is,
restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition
185
Prohibiting 3D printed firearm CAD files obviously
cannot pass this test. They are a novel emerging technology that did not exist
even ten years ago, let alone sufficiently throughout American or English
history to demonstrate a historical practice of proscription.
cryptographic messages, were not categorically excluded from First
Amendment protection.186 As both law and history are against the states
seeking total prohibition, the only means of justifying a content-based total
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Washington Complaint, supra note 6, at 21 41.
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Id.
See supra Section III.
183 See generally United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 18 (2012); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 72 (1942).
184 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 72 (2010).
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Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 722 (quoting Brown v. Entm t Merchs. Ass n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011)).
See supra Section III(B).

392

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 14:365

prohibition left to them would be to argue that the regulation satisfies strict
scrutiny.187
2. Strict Scrutiny Is Not Satisfied Becau
Interest Is Compelling, a Complete Ban Is Not Narrowly
Tailored

dissemination of the CAD files is rooted in public safety.188 It hardly needs
to be recognized that firearms are capable of harming people. Nor is it a
and stripping them of their individual right to own a firearm can be absolutely
trating a proclivity
towards harming others.189 Therefore, even in the event that the Court decides
to engage in a Reed-like legislative motive inquiry, it is all but indisputable
that the states have a legitimate and non-partisan compelling interest in
protecting their citizens from prohibited individuals unlawfully acquiring
firearms. The question then becomes: is the means of achieving this
through total prohibition of access to the CAD files sufficiently narrowly
interest?
source of the evils the [government] seeks to eliminate . . . and eliminates
them without at the same time banning or significantly restricting a
190
substantial quantity of spe
In the
context of 3D printed firearm CAD files, this means that if there is a
substantial quantity of speakers prevented from using the files to convey
information and ideas that do not endanger public safety, then the prospective
statute is not sufficiently narrowly tailored and must fail strict scrutiny.
It is obvious that a total ban on publication, allowing no exceptions,
would suppress all speakers regardless of their lawful or unlawful intended
187 Several doctrines that would allow for content-based regulation under less exacting scrutiny
are inapplicable in Defense Distributed s case. Defense Distributed desires to disseminate the files free of
charge; therefore, they are not proposing a commercial transaction and the commercial speech doctrine
does not apply. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993). Defense
Distributed does not advocate for violent and/or unlawful use of the weapons produced from their CAD
files; therefore, Defense Distributed s speech does not communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence that would invoke the true threat doctrine. See also Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343, 359 60 (2003).
188 See generally Washington Complaint, supra note 6, at 2.
189

See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2019) (detailing the criteria for prohibited persons).
THOMAS E. BAKER ET AL., FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 367 (4th ed. 2018) (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 n.7 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
190

2020]

Cracking the Code

393

use of the CAD files. As such, not only would the ban prevent the evil the
states seek to prevent prohibited persons obtaining firearms outside of the
lawful clearance process but it would chill the speech of lawful speakers
such as mechanical engineering students, licensed firearm manufacturers, or
lawfully permitted amateur gunsmiths.191 The doctrine of narrow tailoring is
not a balancing analysis;192 it does not require a showing that there are
substantially more lawful speakers effected than unlawful speakers, just that
there is a substantial number of lawful speakers who could be affected.
According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, there are
68,341 individuals or companies who in 2017 were licensed to engage in
gunsmithing or manufacturing.193 This represents 85 percent of all federal
firearm license holders in the United States. Even if each license holder were
were discounted, this number represents a substantial population of speakers
by any means. This also excludes the countless number of mechanical
engineering students who may use these files for purely academic purposes.
With so many lawful speakers being affected by a total ban, there is no
possible way that any court could hold that such a ban would be sufficiently
narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny.

V.

POSSIBLE PRIOR RESTRAINTS ACCEPTABLE UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT

This does not mean that there is no state (or federal) regulation that could
survive strict scrutiny.194 In fact, the means for doing so are relatively simple:
the government needs only to avoid the defects in prior regulation attempts
that violated the Constitution. For example, if Washington enacts a law
categorically prohibiting the possession, transmission, or use of CAD files
191 See Section III(C) supra. It is important to note that the phrase amateur gunsmith is not used
to connotate an individual making unauthorized attempts to fabricate or modify firearms, but rather
individual smiths who operate on a small (usually single brick and mortar shop) scale that do not have the
same financial resources as a conventional large-scale manufacturer.
192
In light of the substantial and expansive threats to free expression posed by content-based
restrictions, this Court has rejected as startling and dangerous a free-floating test for First Amendment
coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. United States v.
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (quoting United States v. Stephens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)).
193 Listing of Federal Firearms Licensees, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO & FIREARMS (2017),
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/listing-federal-firearms-licensees-ffls-2017.
194
We have emphasized that it is the rare case in which a State demonstrates that a speech
restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct.
1656, 1665 66 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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for the purposes of designing or manufacturing a firearm, that law is not
sufficiently narrowly tailored and violates the First Amendment. But if
Washington enacts a law prohibiting the possession, transmission, or use of
CAD files for the purpose of designing or manufacturing a firearm by any
person prohibited by state or federal law from obtaining firearms, that statute
would not affect the lawful speakers using the CAD files and so is sufficiently
narrowly tailored.
The state could also define specifically the lawful uses of the files and
provide that only those who have a predetermined lawful purpose are able to
possess the files. For example, Washington could enact a law that required
all individuals who possess, transmit, or use a CAD file to design or
manufacture a firearm hold or be employed by a federal firearm license
holder, or be enrolled in a mechanical engineering program at an accredited
university and acting within the scope of their education. Both proposals
would regulate the evil sought to be prevented by the state (acquisition of
firearms by prohibited persons) without burdening or censoring a substantial
population of speakers not associated with that evil.
Lastly, the state could allow the executive to authorize possession and
use of the CAD files on a case by case basis. However, the state would need
to avoid the constitutional defects associated with the similar federal
regulatory scheme.195 Any abuse of the discretion afforded to the executive
decision maker would need to be swiftly redressed and diligently
prevented.196 To prevent any arguable abuse of discretion, the state must
carefully craft the statute so the language unambiguously defines what acts
and what actors are subject to regulation and specifically enumerate what
factors the state actor can and cannot consider in his decision.197 For example,
the statute could mandate that the decision maker only consider an
affiliation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The controversy surrounding 3D printed firearms presents a complex
legal issue because of the uncertain First Amendment status of the CAD files
at heart of the controversy. With an accurate understanding of the properties
of computer code and computer science,198 it becomes abundantly clear that
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See supra Section IV(A).
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computer code is a medium of pure speech. It is a language that translates
ideas in an identical fashion to traditional spoken languages, and therefore
should be protected by the First Amendment in the same vein as the spoken
or written word.199 Sound legal precedent200 and historical analogs201 from
the founding era support this conclusion. By accurately considering computer
code as pure speech, it is evident that the Western District of Texas erred in
applying the less rigorous standard of intermediate scrutiny reserved for
expressive conduct.202
It is also clear that the existing federal and prospective state regulations
against the CAD files fail to satisfy the weighty standard required to allow a
prior restraint on pure speech.203 Existing federal regulation is
constitutionally invalid because the DDTC acted without regard to the
channeling mechanisms placed on its discretion by Congress.204 Therefore,
de jure character as a content neutral or
content based regulatory scheme, their de facto application was, as regulatory
schemes, with boundless discretion that resulted in politically motivated
viewpoint discrimination.205 The Court has categorically refused to allow
such schemes to survive judicial review.206
Prospective state legislation in the form of a total prohibition is
unconstitutional because there is no historical support for a categorical
exclusion of the files from the protection of the First Amendment.207
Furthermore, because a total prohibition censors such a large pool of lawful
speakers, it is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive the strict scrutiny
analysis associated with evaluation of a content-based prior restraint.208
The federal or state governments remain free to regulate the CAD files
in ways that avoid the constitutional defects explored in this comment. So
long as the discretion of the presiding governmental authority is channeled
when deciding who can access the files, and the regulatory law allows for
sufficient alternative channels for non-prohibited persons to access and use
199
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Bernstein v. U.S. Dep t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
See supra Section III(A).
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See supra Section III(B).
See supra Section IV(A).
203 See supra Section IV.
204 See supra Section IV(A).
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Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
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See supra Section IV(B)(I).
See supra Section IV(B)(II).
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the files for a lawful purpose, the laws will not violate the First Amendment
rights of those publishing, transferring, or consuming the CAD files.

